Moral Realism

Introduction to Moral Realism

Moral realism is the meta-ethical view that there are objective moral facts and properties. According to moral realists, when we make moral claims—such as “murder is wrong” or “generosity is good”—we are making assertions that are either true or false, independent of our opinions, feelings, or cultural conventions. If “murder is wrong” is a moral fact, it remains true even if everyone in a society believed it was right. This position stands in stark contrast to moral anti-realism, which includes theories like emotivism, prescriptivism, and moral relativism.

In this lesson, we will explore the core pillars of moral realism, the different forms it takes (naturalism vs. non-naturalism), and the primary arguments for and against this robust ethical framework.

The Cognitive and Fact-Stating Nature of Ethics

At the heart of moral realism is cognitivism. This is the semantic thesis that moral judgments are expressions of belief that are capable of being true or false. Realists argue that moral language functions exactly like descriptive language. Just as “The cat is on the mat” describes a state of affairs in the world, “Slavery is unjust” describes a moral state of affairs.

Furthermore, realists subscribe to moral objectivism. They hold that the truth-makers for these moral claims are objective. They do not depend on the subjective states of the person making the judgment or the consensus of a particular group. This implies a “mind-independent” moral reality.

Varieties of Moral Realism

Moral Naturalism

Moral naturalists believe that moral facts are just a subset of natural facts—facts that can be investigated through empirical science and observation. For a naturalist, “good” might be redefined in terms of “maximizing human flourishing” or “satisfying biological needs.”

• Analytic Naturalism: Claims that moral terms can be defined using non-moral, natural terms (e.g., “Good means whatever produces the most pleasure”).
• Non-Analytic Naturalism: Argues that while moral properties are natural properties, they cannot be simply defined away. They are discovered through experience, much like we discovered that “water” is "$H_{2}O$".

Moral Non-Naturalism

Non-naturalists, most famously G.E. Moore, argue that moral properties are unique and “sui generis.” Moore’s “Open Question Argument” suggested that any attempt to define “good” in natural terms (like pleasure) fails because it is always a meaningful question to ask, “Is pleasure actually good?” If they were identical, the question would be trivial. Therefore, “good” must be a simple, non-natural property that we perceive through a kind of “rational intuition.”

Arguments for Moral Realism

1. The Argument from Moral Progress: If moral realism is false, “progress” is an illusion. We couldn’t say that the abolition of slavery was an objective improvement; we could only say it was a “change” in preference. Realism provides the best explanation for the sense that we are getting “closer” to the truth about morality.
2. Moral Disagreement: While people disagree about morality, they often argue as if there is a correct answer. We don’t argue about whether chocolate is “better” than vanilla in the same way we argue about whether the death penalty is “just.” The structure of moral debate suggests we believe an objective truth exists.
3. Phenomenology of Moral Experience: When we experience a moral “ought,” it feels like a demand coming from outside ourselves, not a mere preference. Realism honors the way morality actually presents itself to the human mind.

Challenges to Moral Realism

The Argument from Queerness (J.L. Mackie)

Mackie, a famous error theorist, argued that if objective moral values existed, they would be “entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.” He argued that we have no sensory or rational faculty that could “detect” these strange objective values. Furthermore, why would a factual property have an “intrinsic-to-be-pursuedness” built into it?

The Argument from Relativity

Mackie also noted that moral beliefs vary wildly across cultures and history. He argued that it is more parsimonious to explain these differences as reflections of different ways of life rather than as varying degrees of success in perceiving a single, objective moral reality.

The Problem of Supervenience

How do moral properties “attach” to natural properties? We say an act is “bad” because it is a “cold-blooded murder.” But what is the relationship between the physical act (the natural facts) and the moral badness? If they are distinct (non-naturalism), the link seems mysterious.

Conclusion

Moral realism provides a foundation for the “common sense” view of ethics—that some things are really right and others really wrong. However, it faces significant metaphysical and epistemological hurdles in explaining what these moral facts are and how we come to know them. Whether ethics is a discovery of objective truths or a construction of human values remains one of the most contentious debates in philosophy.